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Humanae Vitae and After 
George H. Duggan, S.M. 
Writing six months after the ap-
pearance of Humanae Vitae, Chris-
topher Derrick said he thought the 
encyclical would probably not have 
any long-term consequences of a 
dramatic nature. So far his fore-
cast has been verified. The Church 
has not been rent by open schism, 
and although there have been some 
notable defections occasioned by 
this issue, most of those who have 
rejected the papal teaching have 
contented themselves with "re-
sponsible dissent," while remain-
ing within the visible communion 
of the Church. 
Nonetheless, the past four years 
have witnessed some interesting 
developments in the realm of ethi-
cal theory - developments which 
could h<l ve been foreseen by the 
observer with some training in phi-
losophy. For, as Gilson has pointed 
out, once we have adopted a phil-
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osophical principle, we are no long-
er at liberty to think as we might 
wish, for the subsequent develop-
ment of our thought, if we are to be 
consistent, is dictated by the prin-
ciple. 
The central argument of Human-
ae Vitae is that contraception is in-
trinsically evil because it is opposed 
to the natural law and consequently 
is never lawful for any reason what-
soever, since we may never do evil 
even to achieve the most praise-
worthy of ends. 
Those who rejected this very clear 
teaching did so on a variety of 
grounds. Some argued that Chris-
tian morality is not concerned with 
material conformity to physiologi-
cal processes but with intentions, 
and hence it would not matter if, 
in individual acts of marital inter-
course, artificial means of prevent-
ing conception were employed, pro-
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vided the partners did n6t adopt a 
"contraceptive mentality." Ot!1ers 
appealed to the authority of those 
whom Father Richard McCormick 
has described as "established theo-
logians," who publicly and almost 
immediately voiced their "sincere 
and responsible dissent" from the 
papal teaching. I 
Moral Insights 
Others appealed to the moral 
insights of the faithful, of whom 
great numbers had found that the 
use of contraceptives contributed 
to the happiness and stability of 
their marriages and seemed so 
clearly justified by their circum-
stances as to cause no qualms of 
conscience. Since they, no less than 
the clergy, are under the guidance 
of the Spirit of truth, their witness 
must be taken seriously as pointing 
to a true development of Christian 
thought on this question. 
Finally, it was argued that God 
has given man the power and the 
duty, through the creative capacity 
of human reason, to actuate his 
own personal nature. Since this na-
ture is not something static but is 
subject to the same evolutionary 
development as the rest of creation, 
it is right and proper for man to 
make use of the means that mod-
ern science has provided to achieve 
a fuller human life, making it more 
fully human by bringing concep-
tion, hitherto the sport of instinct 
and chance, under the dominion 
of reason. 
This last argument, based on an 
evolutionary conception of morali-
ty, has been developed by St. John-
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Stevas in his book, The Agonizing 
Choice. He writes: 
"The implicit rejection of the evolution-
ary in man's affairs is one of the most sur-
prising features of the Encyclical . Man, 
nature, reason, are all treated as though 
they were static not dynamic concepts, 
yet, by definition, reason should conform 
to the level of knowledge reached in con-
temporary developed societies. . . . It 
would be strange indeed if in this new 
world, evolving at unprecedented speed, 
morals alone were to remain static and not 
be subject to change. Morality must change 
and evolve since it represents man's re-
sponse to other men in a state of bio~ul­
tural evolution. Accordingly, human na-
ture, while it has certain fixed elements, 
contains others which are subject to con-
tinuous change. The pace of change today 
in the relationship of man and woman ap-
pears to be especially rapid." 2 
It is not surprising to find that 
St. John-Stevas, after propounding 
this evolutionary view of morality, 
goes on a few pages later to argue 
for the lawfulness of direct sterili-
zation for contraceptive purposes 
when the good of the individual 
or the family requires the avoid-
ance of further pregnancies. 
Right to Life 
He draws the line, however, at 
abortion. No matter how much the 
right to life has been violated in 
our time, we must, he contends, 
maintain belief in the principle 
that man's right to life is sacred 
and inviolable. 3 But it is hard 
to see what answer he could make 
to a person who was arguing for a 
"liberalization" of the Church's 
teaching on abortion on the ground 
that this change is required if we 
are to bring Catholic thinking into 
line with "the level of knowledge 
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of contemporary developed socie-
ties" - for it is a commonplace 
that in these developed societies, 
the lawfulness of abortion in cer-
tain cases is taken for granted. 
Where St. lohn-Stevas has balked 
at accepting the logical conclusion 
implied in his principle that moral-
ity must be dynamic, other thinkers 
have been less hesitant. A notable 
example is Daniel Callahan. From 
arguing for the lawfulness of con-
traception, he has gone on to justify 
abortion. The principle he evokes 
is wide-ranging indeed, for it 
amounts to a claim that man in 
making his ethical judgments is 
absolutely autonomous. He writes: 
"Contraception, abortion, euthanasia, 
medical experimentation and the prolong-
ation of life are all problems which fall 
totally within the sphere of human rules 
and judgments." 4 
Whether Callahan's book is an 
expression of the "best contempo-
rary wisdom" and falls within the 
ambit of "the responsible theolog-
ical literature of the past year or 
so," to which Father McCormick 
has referred, 5 I do not know. 
But obviously, when it is a ques-
tion of the wisdom of a contempo-
rary thinker or the responsibility of 
a theologian, there is room for a 
difference of opinion. One may 
reasonably ask: How responsible 
is a theologian who will allow 
abortion when the Church has al-
ways condemned this as a viola-
tion of the right to life, most re-
cently and in the strongest terms 
at Vatican II? 6 
Clearly there has been a radical 
shift in a good deal of Catholic 
ethical thinking in recent years. For 
many, this shift has been a welcome 
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change. Thus Warren T. Reich 
writes: 
"In the past 16 years Catholic moral 
theology has undergone a profound ren-
aissance. It is now more centered on the 
person of Christ, emphasizes the law of 
love in man's personal response to God, 
acknowledges that the moral life depends 
on a process of growth, and admits the 
uniqueness and significance of the situa-
tion in which man makes each of his moral 
decisions." 7 
Underlying Causes 
What, we may inquire, are the 
underlying causes of this profound 
change? On the theological level, 
there is a certain impatience with 
the concept that the ecclesiastical 
magisterium has the right to lay 
down the law on issues where the 
natural law is involved. As War-
ren Reich puts it, more and more 
Christians "do not want to be put 
down with authoritarian dicta," 8 
but want to solve their moral prob-
lems by means of their enlight-
ened conscience. 
On the philosophical level, the 
cause is the rejection by great num-
bers of Thomistic metaphysics and 
in particular the doctrine of Mod-
erate Realism regarding the value 
of our universal concepts. If we 
change our metaphysics, this cannot 
but have an effect on our thinking 
in ethics, for ethical questions are 
not discussed in a philosophical 
vacuum. Plato makes this clear in 
The Republic, where he shows 
that if we are to answer the ques-
tion posed at the beginning of the 
dialogue, "What is a good man?" 
we must engage in a metaphysical 
discussion of the nature of good-
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ness and explain the goodness of 
the good man in terms of his rela-
tion to the Supreme Good. 
To take a question much dis-
cussed in our day, the validity or 
otherwise of Situationism, we find 
that before we can deal with this 
ethical problem, we must face the 
more fundamental question: Can 
we talk sensibly about human na-
ture as such? To this question the 
Thomist philosopher answers in 
the affirmative, the Situationist in 
the negative. Situationism in eth-
ics had its foundation in the Nom-
inalist view that all we can really 
know is the individual human be-
ing, so that our ethical judgments 
can only be about the way a partic-
ular individual should behave In 
his concrete circumstances. 
Moral Absolutes 
If, on the other hand, we adopt 
the Thomistic view that we can 
make valid affirmations about 
human nature as such, we are in 
a position to assert that there is a 
natural moral law which applies, 
without exception, to all in whom 
human nature is found. The con-
tent of this moral law is the "moral 
absolutes," to which Father Mc-
Cormick refers, and they extend 
much further than he is prepared 
to allow, vis ., to such items as that 
"human life must be respected" and 
"all patients are to be treated just-
ly." 9 Among these moral abso-
lutes are the prohibition of adul-
tery, abortion and contraception. 
The infringement of these prohibi-
tions is never lawful because it 
would be contrary to the natural 
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law which is itself a participation 
in, and reflection of, the eternal 
law by which God as the Author 
of nature directs all creatures to 
their respective ends. Because 
such actions are opposed to the 
natural law and so to the eternal 
law, they are always intrinsically 
evil and objectively sinful. 
To describe these precepts of 
the natural law as "a static code 
of obligatory precepts," as Warren 
Reich does,)O is to misconceive 
their nature. In the first place, they 
are essentially dynamic, as they 
have to do with the direction of 
man to his Last End. Secondly, 
they are not mere positive laws, 
as the term "obligatory precepts" 
would suggest, but flow from the 
nature of man and derive their 
obligatory force from man's su-
preme obligation, expressed in the 
law of love, the First Command-
ment of the law. 
Law of Love 
But the law of love, which de-
mands a personal response to God, 
though paramount, is clearly unable 
to provide an answer to specific mor-
al questions, to determine whether 
this or that action is truly an expres-
sion of love or otherwise. Is contra-
ceptive intercourse, for example, 
really an expression of honest love 
or is it, as Christopher Derrick has 
maintained, obviously dishonest, 
since it is "the enactment or pre-
tense of a total surrender which is 
- in point of fact - very care-
fully prevented from taking place"?)) 
That question can be answered, as 
Pope Paul answered it, only by 
61 
considering the nature of the act 
which is essentially, though not ex-
clusively, procreative 12 and go-
ing on from there to determine 
what are the demands of the nat-
ural law. To attempt to answer the 
question when one has discarded 
the principle of natural law. is to 
abandon all hope of rationally jus-
tifying the prohibition of such vices 
as sodomy, as the London Tablet 
admitted in an editorial. 13 
It leads also, as we have re-
marked, to the abandonment of 
the absolute prohibition of abor-
tion. Germain Grisez some years 
ago argued to the inevitability of 
this development, but his views 
were not well received. He wrote: 
"When I pointed out in 1964-1968 that 
the dissenting position on contraception 
would also justify abortion, I was attacked 
as deficient in the rudimentary skills of 
logic." 14 
Recent developments have shown 
that his logic was not so rudimen-
tary after all, for to quote him 
once more: 
" It had now become clearer and clearer 
that to set oneself against the start of hu-
man life is to begin to set oneself against 
human life itself." 15 
There is an inner strength in a 
position taken on some moral is-
sue such as abortion when this po-
sition is one item in a system 
marked by philosophical consist-
ency. This strength is lacking, I 
suggest, when an opponent of abor-
tion is prepared to allow the law-
fulness of contraception, for when 
one has jettisoned one's principles 
on one issue, they are no longer 
available for defending one's posi-
tion on another. The moral for the 
theologian surely is that it would 
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be the part of Christian wisdom 
to take the encyclical, an extreme-
ly solemn and weighty exercise of 
papal authority, as it stands, reject-
ing as contrary to the natural moral 
law such aberrations as abortion, 
direct sterilization and contracep-
tion. Only thus will he be able to 
provide an intellectually respecta-
ble defense of man's dignity, not 
only as a Christian but as a human 
being. 
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